

WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL
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Thank you very much, John. Your description of why I was selected for this position is one that I believe, my mother believes, but John McCone, sitting on my right, does not. Because he asked me during this luncheon how I happened to shift from the Navy to intelligence and I confessed. I said I got it strictly on merit; I was a Naval Academy classmate of the President.

This is a very important period in American intelligence right now. We are undergoing a series of profound changes. Changes that are both fundamental, far-reaching, and I believe, beneficial. They are changes not generated from within, they are changes that are the result of three external factors. The first of these is an evolving and different perception by the United States of its role in international affairs. The second is the burgeoning capabilities which American industry, with its sophistication, is giving to us in the technical intelligence fields that John McCone described to you briefly. The third factor is the increasing interest and concern of the American public in the intelligence activities of our country ever since the investigations of the period 1974 to 1976. What I would like to do briefly today is to discuss these three factors for change and how they are bringing about a different intelligence process for our nation.

Let me start with the changing perception of our role in the world. I believe that as a country we are in a period of transition. A transition from a very activist, interventionist mode in international affairs

to one in which there is a greater recognition of the limits on our ability to influence events in other countries. This is by no means to say that we are approaching a period of retrenchment towards isolationism. I believe, in fact, that we are gradually emerging from our post-Vietnam aversion to any intervention on the international scene, and instead, are entering into an era where our view of the world is much more reasonable and much more balanced. Clearly we, the United States, must continue to play a major role on the world scene. Yet the circumstances today are such that we must gauge much more carefully than ever before what that role can be and should be.

Look, for instance, at the difficulty that we have today simply deciding whom we are for and whom we are against on the international scene. Traditionally we were always in favor of those whom the Soviets were oppressing or were opposed to. But such a criteria, had we applied it just last year in 1978, would have been very difficult for us. Let me just give you a couple of examples.

In February and March of last year there was a war between Ethiopia and Somalia. The Soviets were for Ethiopia, against the Somalians. But Somalia was governed by a Marxist dictator who was the aggressor in this war. It's difficult for us to pick that side to be in favor of simply because the Soviets were opposed to it. Last December there was another war between Vietnam and Cambodia. The Soviets were supporting Vietnam. Should we have supported Pol Pot, the leader of Cambodia, a man who had a regime that was perhaps more oppressive than any on the globe since Adolf Hitler? A choice difficult for us today to tell the white hats from the black, to really know where our national interests lie. Communism is no longer made of a whole cloth.

In addition, it is not nearly so clear today that the consequence of another nation succumbing to communist influence is irreversible as we often once thought. We have had examples in Indonesia, the Sudan, Egypt, and Somalia where they were locked under considerable communist domination and yet they have come back to independence. So today there is a legitimate question in our body politic as to whether it is necessary to come to the rescue of countries being subjected to communist pressures.

Even when we do decide that some struggling nation deserves our support, there are problems in providing that support today which simply did not exist a decade or two ago. One of these stems from the revolution in international communications. Today on the international scene any action that we take will be almost instantly communicated around the world, subjected to analysis and instantly judged. And that international public judgment--sometimes approbation, sometimes criticism--does influence events and does inhibit even major countries like ourselves and the Soviet Union, even though the countries expressing approbation or criticism are generally second- or third-level powers.

If then, we attempt to sway other countries through diplomacy or international organizations, there are other difficulties today also, difficulties we did not face in the past. In the past, most free nations of the world followed our lead on the international political scene. Today in such fora as the United Nations, each country usually votes its own one vote independently of what the major powers desire and, in fact, the major powers most frequently find themselves on the short end of those votes. If in frustration with diplomacy, we decide instead to

try military intervention, there are still other problems today that did not exist not too long ago. The memory of Vietnam tells us that when the pendulum of offense and defense in military weaponry is tending towards the defense, as I believe it is today, even minor military powers can cause a lot of problems for major military nations.

What all this adds up to then is not that we are impotent in world affairs, but that the leverage of our influence, while it is still considerable, must be exercised more subtly if it is to be effective. We must be more concerned with the long-term, underlying influences rather than just putting our finger in the dike here and there. We must be able to anticipate rather than just react to events. We must be able to look beneath the surface and see what forces are really influencing and can be changed and driven over time if we work at it gradually. For us in the intelligence world this means that we must vastly expand the scope of our endeavors.

Thirty years ago our primary concern was to keep track of Soviet military developments. Today the threat to our national well-being comes not only from actions of the Soviet Union, and not only from military matters, we must be concerned with a subject matter which has much broader scope. We cannot ignore the importance of military events and military technology, but we must broaden our outlook to include politics, economic, food, world population, energy resources, terrorism, narcotics, the health and psychiatry of world leaders, and many other fields. In fact there is hardly an academic discipline, there is hardly an area of the world about which we must not be able to provide good information to

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our nation's leaders. Hence this is a demanding time for intelligence
and one of fundamental change in which the subject matter of our work is
expanding vastly.

The second major factor which I suggested was driving change in our
intelligence family is a technological revolution which affects how we
collect our information. Basically, as John McCone outlined to you,
there are three ways of acquiring information about other countries--by
photographs from satellites and airplanes; by the intercept of signals
passing through the air such as in this room today, signals from military
equipment, signals from communications systems; and finally, from human
collection, the traditional spy.

The first of these two--photographs and signals intercept--are what we
call technical systems of collection as opposed to the human means. Our
capabilities in the technical area, thanks to the great sophistication of
American industry, are really expanding every day. Interestingly, though,
rather than this denigrating the value or the need for the traditional
human intelligence activity, it in fact increases its importance.
Broadly speaking, what technical intelligence collection tells you is
something about what happened in the past in some other country, it often
raises more questions than it answers. People then come to you and say,
but why did that happen and what is going to happen next? Uncovering the
concerns of other countries, the pressures which influence their decisions
and their intentions, is the unique forte of the human intelligence agent
and it is indispensable if we are going to hope to be able to anticipate
these future trends and to gear our foreign policy to looking towards
influencing events more in the future than in the immediate period. This

means for us in intelligence, however, that we have a new challenge. A challenge of being able to pull together these efforts in the photographic, signals, and human intelligence spheres, orchestrating them so that they can complement each other, so that we can learn what our policy makers need to know in the least expensive and the least risky manner. What questions a photograph cannot answer we try to answer by looking in the signals or the human field. For instance, the plans which may be hinted at in a conversation may be confirmed by a photograph. Or you may have a photograph of a new industrial facility and you do not know whether it is a nuclear weapons plant or something in the commercial field, and that is when you target your human intelligence activity to try specifically to find out what that picture really means. All this may seem very simple and very logical to you, but our technical capabilities are growing so and are so relatively new and almost overwhelming to us that we can no longer do business in our traditional way.

Intelligence in our country is a large bureaucracy and it is spread over numerous agencies and departments, each of which has its own priorities and its own concerns. The Director of Central Intelligence has always, since the National Security Act of 1947, been authorized to coordinate all of these intelligence activities whatever their department or agency. Until recently, however, he has not had adequate authority to do that properly. President Carter, just a little over a year ago, signed a new Executive Order strengthening the authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence specifically over the budgets and the collection activities of all of these various national intelligence activities. This process of using these new authorities is still evolving, it is one that is

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coming along well, and it is going to make a very substantial difference
in the management of intelligence in this country.

The third factor I mentioned was the change, or the increase, in public interest in intelligence ever since the investigations. Those investigations brought to American intelligence activities more public attention than there has ever been in the history of the world in any major intelligence organization. There were substantial benefits both to the public and to us in intelligence from those investigations and that visibility. But there was also an unfortunate side effect. This was the destruction of much of the confidence and support which the American public had traditionally held for its intelligence organizations. Thus, while I am today seeing a gradual return of that support and confidence, I also recognize a lingering suspicion in some quarters that questions whether intelligence organizations are still engaged in the kinds of activities for which we were criticized. I can assure you that we are not.

Moreover, we now have a series of oversight procedures which serve as an important check on intelligence. To begin with there is the President himself, who takes a very direct and a very personal interest in what we are doing. Beyond that, there is the President's Intelligence Oversight Board which has opened itself to the entire American public to hear of possible abuses and which reports only to the President on its findings. And then there are two intelligence committees of Congress who conduct a thorough oversight of our activities. And last, but not least, there is, of course, the American press which is much more interested today and much more persevering in learning what we are doing than it ever has been before.

Now the impact of all this added visibility has been very substantial. In fact, for the professionals in intelligence it has been traumatic. The right kind of visibility can be beneficial to both the public and to us in intelligence. By the right kind I mean public access to information which permits you to understand in generic terms at least what we are doing and why, which enables you to assure yourself we are not doing things that we should not. We need, however, through this process of greater visibility, to regenerate this sense of confidence that we are not invading the rights of Americans. We did this in part last year with a new Foreign Surveillance Act which was passed by the Congress and which goes a long way to ensure against violations of American privacy. Beyond that, we are trying just to be more open about the things we do. We are passing more of what we study and analyze directly to you in unclassified form through regular publication of our analytic work. In fact, if you are interested as you leave today, we will have some samples of recent unclassified publications available to you at the door. We are also out in public as I am privileged to be with you today, speaking more. We are answering questions more. We are participating more in academic symposia and conferences. I know that our Intelligence Community is doing an honorable and a vital job for this country and I, personally, want you to know as much about it as possible.

Yet clearly, as I am sure you would recognize, much of the publicity, much of the visibility that we have is unwanted, unhelpful, and benefits no American. Here I am talking of the unauthorized disclosures of properly classified information. At the least these disclosures are demoralizing to our intelligence services. Services that have traditionally,

and of necessity, operated largely in secrecy. But far more important is the destructive effect which such disclosures can have on our long-term ability to do what we are mandated to do by the President and by the Congress.

First of all, no foreign intelligence service, no individual in a foreign country is going to entrust lives or highly sensitive information to us if they do not think we can keep identities and information secret when necessary. Very simply, too much is at stake. Secondly, it is impossible to carry out a quest for information in a closed society like the Soviet Union if what we do and how we do it is bound to become a matter of public information in our country. Not only do these revelations reduce our capability to produce intelligence on which our policy makers can base sound decisions, but cumulatively they damage the long-term ability of this country to know what is going on in many closed societies. Because we are such an open society we often do not appreciate how much other nations can take advantage of us if we do not take the precaution of being well informed. Actions like those of the Soviet Union in entering the world wheat market without any notice in 1972 affect you and me in our pocketbook, and other surreptitious moves like this can affect us in our national security.

Yet let me say that overall I believe the net impact of this increased visibility to intelligence in our country is a plus. We must have public support, we must prevent abuses in the future. There are, of course, minuses as well. There are the inhibitions on the actions that we can take and the risks that we will take. The issue before us today is really how much assurance does the nation want and need against invasions

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of privacy and against the taking of foreign policy actions which are considered unethical. How do we make the balance between these desires for privacy and propriety on the one hand, and good production of intelligence on the other.

Congress is expected to give expression to this question of balance very soon. It will do so in legislation establishing what are known as Charters for the Intelligence Community. Such legislation will set out on the one hand the authority for what we do and, on the other hand, the parameter of the boundaries within which we must operate. It is my hope that such legislation defining charters for us will be passed by this Congress, written with care and sensitivity to the problems I have been discussing. This may help to resolve some of these difficult issues. Overreaction, either by tying our hands on the one hand or leaving us strictly without any boundaries or instructions could be bad. The one could emasculate our capabilities to gather necessary information, the other could invite future problems.

After all these comments, though, let me assure you that in my view the intelligence arm of our government is today strong and capable. It is undergoing substantial change, yes, and that is never an easy or a placid process in a large bureaucracy. But out of this present metamorphosis is emerging an intelligence community in which the legal rights of our citizens and the constraints and controls on intelligence are going to be balanced with a continuing need to be able to garner information necessary for the conduct of our country's foreign policy. This is not an easy transition. We are not there yet. But we are moving rapidly and

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surely in the right direction. When we reach our goal we will have constructed a new model of intelligence, a uniquely American model reflecting the laws and the ideals of our country. As we proceed down this important path, we need your support and understanding. I am therefore very grateful that you have taken the time to be here today and have asked me to be with you. Thank you.



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